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James O'Toole  and the University of Southern California Center for Futures 
Research, Energy and Social Change. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.  Press, 1976), 
185 pp. 
This book is intended to be an antidote to pessimism about the limits of  the 
American system9 If it has a contribution to make, according to the authors, 
9 . . it is to suggest a modest redirection of the attention of policy makers to some 
overlooked but realistic energy options and opportunities that might be realized within the 
limits of the existing system (p. xi). 
The future is not as bad as it may seem, if the right choices are made. 
The principal opportunity appears to be the creation of  a post-1990 Quality 
Economy and something called ultimate abundance. Such an economy would reduce 
pollution and inefficiency, create full employment in meaningful jobs, and produce 
goods and services that enhance the quality of  life, not just the GNP. And 
presumably there would be plenty of energy. 
The principal options for public policy are higher energy prices; incentives to 
make the domestic energy market more competitive (e.g., deregulation of natural 
gas prices); and incentives for oil and gas exploration and conservation. In addition, 
something would have to be done to help the poorest families get by with higher 
energy prices9 
The implications for corporate planners are reassuring. Corporate planning will 
be more complex, but the basic ground rules for US industry will not change. An 
increase in energy research and capital investment will create opportunities " to  
capture these resources9 Future plant and equipment should be not only energy- 
efficient, but adaptable to a variety of fuels. Energy dislocations will be 
concentrated on large mass production industries, necessitating diversification from 
middle-range technologies toward high and low technologies. Finally, the relative 
scarcity of capital and energy will require management to attend more to the 
development and proper utilization of human resources. 
The link between these current options and long-run opportunities is faith in the 
market. If energy prices rise enough and a little competitive imagination is applied, 
the right technologies will be chosen (including electrification, superbatteries, and 
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methanol fuel), various substitutions will be made, and almost everything else will 
fall into place. However, politics have gotten in the way of raising the price of 
energy to market-clearing levels9 The integration of  energy needs, social values and 
economic aspirations 
9 . . is a challenge not likely to be met in the near future because the values, goals, and 
economic priorities of powerful groups in America are competing and conflicting--and 
there is no sign of willingness to coalesce around a common agenda (p. 33). 
In addition, businessmen faced with free market opportunities do not always live up 
to theoretical expectations, and private decision makers appear to be unaware of the 
full range of  options and the implications of change. 
We shall probably not succeed in creating a future with abundant energy and high quality 
of life unless we free ourselves from the constraints of corporate groupthink and 
governmental central planning and controls (p. 132). 
Powerful groups, businessmen, and private decision makers need to be enlightened, 
but these are problems left for the reader. 
Statements about the future in this book are grounded primarily in a Delphi study 
conducted in three rounds between November, 1974, and March, 1975. The study 
was disaggregated into technology, economic, and social panels, each comprised of 
the relevant specialists. Whatever was put in by individual specialists, what comes 
out is an aggregation of  preferences, hunches, and theory that appear to be an 
affirmation of  faith. One wonders whether the Delphi method is anything more than 
institutionalized groupthink at a distance. In any case, the results should not be 
dismissed because the preconceptions of policy analysts sometimes turn out to be the 
main determinants of policy. 
The questions put to the Delphi panels are reproduced as the last chapter, along 
with results, and provide interesting reading. For example, the economics panel was 
asked about the redistribution of  power and status among elites that would result 
from energy scarcity and from energy abundance. There turned out to be a 
consensus that the power and status of  national economic planners, technologists, 
coal- and nuclear-based utilities, and bureaucrats in control of allocations would be 
strongly enhanced under conditions of scarcity. Scientists, political activists, and 
economists would also make some gains9 The power and status of  environmental 
specialists would be enhanced under energy abundance, but black marketeers, 
bureaucrats in control of allocations, and coal- and nuclear-based utilities would all 
suffer losses in some degree. No consensus was reached on the implications of future 
scarcity or abundance for big business. 
The authors acknowledge the financial contributions of  the external members of 
the USC Council on the Future: Atlantic Richfield Company Foundation; State of  
California Department of  Transportation; Ford Motor Company Fund; General 
Electric Foundation; Pitney Bowes; Sears, Roebuck; Standard Oil of  California; 
Standard Oil (Indiana); TRW; and Union Carbide. 
Reviewed by RONALD D. BRUNNER, University of  Michigan. 
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H. George Frederickson and Charles H. Wise, Public Administration and Public 
Policy. (Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1977), 228 pp. (Policy Studies Organization 
Series, 13) $14.00. 
The title of this book suggests an introductory treatment of a broad range of topics 
in public administration. Until this point in time, textbooks generally have focused 
either on public administration or public policy; those concentrating on policy have 
not pretended to deal with the varied subject matter of public administration. 
Is the Frederickson/Wise book, then, a new comprehensive and unifying 
introduction to fields which previously have been treated separately? The answer is 
no o It certainly is not an introduction, and it lacks a unifying theme necessary to a 
comprehensive survey. The editors say it is their major objective to "examine 
continually evolving relationships between public administration and public 
policy." The focus, however, is on matters falling in the interstices between public 
administration and public policy. The contributors look at the formulation and 
reformulation of public policy that occur as public organizations administer the 
programs for which they are responsible. 
Each contributor's mission is to survey relevant theory-building and research 
findings on a topic familiar to students of public administration, e.g., personnel 
administration, administrative behavior, leadership, budgeting, etc. All contri- 
butions are then supposed to identify and assess for the reader the policy 
implications of the research cited. Not all chapters actually do so. A stringent space 
limitation must have been imposed on each author because amplificaiion, 
interpretation and explanation are limited or, in some cases, lacking altogether. In a 
couple of chapters even clear identification of the principal policy issues is absent. 
There always is the opportunity for individual authors, in commissioned essays, 
to mount their favorite hobby horses. Fortunately, most, but not all, of the material 
in this book is representative of the mainstream of what the editors refer to as the 
"developing theory, research and practice in the field." 
For example, the first chapter of the book links problems of program 
administration with their roots in the policy-making process. Appropriately titled 
"Implementation," it contains a plea for more active participation by political 
scientists in policy analysis because the implementation of federal programs must be 
understood as a "rich political, bureaucratic process" which seems "far too 
unsystematic, immeasureable and theoretical to many economists." 
Policy analysis in federal departments has been dominated by economists who 
are "peculiarly deficient in their understanding of the problems of institutional 
implementation of programs." Political scientists would pay more attention than 
economists to the "black box" of delivery systems. After a discussion of how 
several federal programs might have benefited from advance estimates of the 
political and bureaucratic problems of implementation, the chapter cites several 
research-based maxims for social scientists who might be asked to advise on 
implementation strategies. 
This discussion of implementation strategies is supported by useful chapters on 
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the design of public organizations and on administrative behavior. The chapter 
titled "Managing Subordinates" has a helpful how-to approach. The chapter on 
budgeting covers a great deal of ground in brief, readable fashion, and deals 
succinctly and sensibly with zero-based budgeting. A chapter on productivity is very 
helpful in identifying policy questions implicit in developing the application of this 
concept to governmental operations. The chapter on citizen participation places the 
fundamental dilemma of the administrator's role and responsibility in sharp focus. 
The compactness of the writing is illustrated by the fact that 12 of the 16 chapters 
contained fewer than 12 pages of text; six chapters had fewer than 10 pages; two 
were 8 pages long and two contained only 6 pages. While brevity is to be 
commended, there is a penalty in this book. The density of writing makes for hard 
slogging. For example, can justice be done to the rich literature on the subject of 
leadership in 6 pages? A more extended treatment of fewer topics would have given 
the book more cohesion and the reader would have received a better perspective of 
interrelationships. 
It would have been helpful for many readers if the editors had included an 
integrative headnote for each of the four sections into which the book is divided. At 
the very least, the headnotes could have explained the relevance of each of the 
chapters to the general topic of the section and to the overall theme of the book. For 
example, it was disconcerting to find a chapter on intergovernmental fiscal relations 
in Part II, entitled "The Actors in Administering Public Policy," rather than in 
tandem with a chapter on budgeting in Part III, which has the heading, 
"Administering Public Policy Decision Processes." In short, a contribution of what 
we all know to be the editors' knowledge and expertise in the field would have 
enhanced the book's value. Their contribution would have been particularly 
important in providing perspective and injecting unity into a wide-ranging set of 
topics. 
It is difficult to determine the audience for which this book was written. There is 
no reference in the preface to the editors' intentions. It clearly is not for beginning 
public administration students. Neither would many practitioners find time spent on 
this book rewarding. Advanced graduate students and those who teach in the field 
would find the essays useful (some far more than others) and the bibliographies 
would prove helpful. 
Given the disorganized state of our literature, it is incumbent on authors and 
editors to provide background and state objectives for a work such as this. The 
preface, however, is only half a page long. Surely the remaining half page could 
have been used to explain the editors' purpose more fully. Is it not the function of a 
preface to explain why a book has been written? 
Having mentioned hobby horses, I should point out that one of mine is arguing 
that high readability is perfectly compatible with rigor and sophistication in this as 
in all fields. Fifteen introductory texts in public administration have been analyzed 
for their readability and have been found wanting. J Their average score was closer to 
I James S. Bowman (1977). "The  readability of introductory textbooks in public administration," 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 22: 373-76. 
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"very difficult" than "di f f icul t . "  Using the same widely-accepted tool z for 
analyzing the Frederickson/Wise book, I found that its readability, alas, ranks as 
"very  difficult ." If there are readable books on nuclear physics, as there are, why 
not in public administration and public policy? 
Reviewed by ROBERT F. WILCOX, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of 
Colorado. 
Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens A f ter  a Bill Becomes a 
Law (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1977), xi, 323 pp. 
One of the conceits of American political science has been that politics focuses on 
legislation; here it is that the indifferent American voter cared little for issues, 
candidates, even who is President. As the cataclysms of  the 1960s--Viet-Nam, 
drugs, environmental decay, and urban rioting--gave way to the long marches of 
the 1970s--inflation, energy, affirmative action, and school busing--the apathetic 
voter has given way to the single-issue fanatic. 
And policy analysis has discovered, once again, implementation. To the current 
surge of  studies of  " implementat ion"  (what it is remains uncomfortably unclear) 
Eugene Bardach of Berkeley's Graduate School of Public Policy has contributed a 
good, if flawed, book. The Implementation Game is a substantial improvement on 
Pressman and Wildavsky's Implementation, the book that heralded the fad. 
Bardach will be especially useful for students inexperienced in the ways of  public 
organizations. But reflecting the uncertain vision of " implemenat ion"  that we all 
suffer from, Bardach's book tends to be perishably specific, yet conceptually 
murky. The specificity derives from Bardach's study of  the implementation of  the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which decentralized mental health services in 
California in the early 1970s. Chapter I, an account of LPS's  early years, is 
interminable and perplexing; a dubious strategy even if that may be part of the 
point. At the same time, Bardach's use of  an informal game theoretic language does 
not provide enough conceptual power' to go much beyond a survey of some of the 
more frequently found "games"  played in pursui t - -and evasion--of  legislative 
mandates. Finally, the imposing price tag of $17.95 for a book modest in concept 
and execution poses a barrier worth noting, even in these days of  high-priced 
publishing. 
The renewed interest in implementation is welcome, but hardly novel: Carl 
Friedrich observed in 1940 that "Public  policy, to put it flatly, is a continuous 
process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution . . . .  Politics and 
administration play a continuous role in both formation and execution, though 
there is probably more politics in the formation of policy, more administration in 
the execution of  it. Insofar as particular individuals or groups are gaining or losing 
2 The readability formula found in Rudolf Flesch (1949), The Art of Readable Writing, New York: 
Collier. 
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power or control in a given area, there is politics; insofar as officials act or propose 
action in the name of the public interest, there is administration." Thus, the 
complaint of the Berkeley Know-Nothing School that there is a paucity of 
"significant analytical work dealing with implementation" raises expectations about 
what is meant by "analytical." In fact, nothing in the slender implementation 
literature of the 1970s so far improves noticeably upon the vas~--if largely 
disappointing--output of students of public administration dating back six decades. 
The novelty of implementation as a scholarly problem seems to reflect a broader 
social perception: that government programs often have identifiable starting points, 
but rarely have perceptible--and hardly ever satisfyingupoints of conclusion. So 
implementation has become a subject around which neoconservative complaints 
have crystallized. Bardach's Chapter X lays heavy emphasis, unsurprisingly, on 
market-like strategies for avoiding policy administration in the first place--a major 
means for short-circuiting implementation difficulties. This taste for "postliberal 
heresies" bypasses Theodore Lowi's complaint of a decade ago: that the trouble 
with our public policy is that the law is too vague--that legislators delegate too 
extensively to the executive branch. At least with LPS, that was presumably not the 
case, since, as Bardach recounts, its senior legislative author proved to be a 
nonpareil of legislative oversight. 
Yet the point that Lowi makes underlies much of the conservative complaint, 
reflecting as it does the extraordinary mismatch between the prescriptive capabilities 
of legislators and the complexity and changeability of the world they would rule. 
"Implementation," put forth as a single analytical construct, promises too much. 
The world in which laws and public policies flourish, obsolesce, and die is far too 
variable to be subsumed by a single process, however protean. It is no surprise, then, 
that the five models of implementation discussed by Bardach in Chapter II all prove 
to be inadequate to the task. Their common denominator, like the informal game 
theory which he suggests as a substitute, is a concern with the defensive politicking 
undertaken by bureaucrats, clienteles, and professionals in response to new 
legislative mandates. Making use of the drawn-out sequential processes which 
normally accompany regulatory policies, and political authorities' zone of 
acceptance of delay and intransigence, a policy opposed by--or simply not 
particularly salient to--major audiences in the "real world" can be delayed, 
deflected, defeated. 
Bardach's notion of "games" is closer to psychologist Eric Berne's Games People 
Play than to the game theory of yon Neumann and Morgenstern. As in popular 
psychology, Bardach's games have catchy names--Odd Man Out, Up For Grabs, 
and Massive Resistance are three of the more memorable. And in contrast to 
Schelling's masterful analysis of interdependent bargaining, there is little systematic 
that is said about the environments which structure incentives for the behaviors 
Bardach names. 
Without clear hypotheses, Bardach is reduced to an ethological inventory. This 
strategy causes him to bypass much that is useful in administrative and organization 
theory, as in the discussion of administrative difficulties in Chapter V. Yet there are 
also benefits to this approach; some phenomena are sufficiently messy, at our 
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present level of understanding, to benefit from an informal, descriptive approach. 
The analysis, also in Chapter V, of social entropy, and the ineluctabilities of 
ineptness, human variability, and elusive coordination says much that is obvious to 
organizational veterans, yet difficult to include in organizational management 
textbooks. Bardach's greatest success comes in Chapter IX, an analysis of 
negotiation and its difficulties, which puts the game idea to work with excellent 
effect. The behavioral model of distrust put forth on pages 229-30 is quite 
interesting, although Bardach unfortunately does not provide sharply focused 
hypotheses and real-world tests. 
A consistent concern of The Implementation Game is how the excesses of the 
game may be remedied. Bardach argues early on that "the character and degree of 
many implementation problems are inherently unpredictable" (p. 5). Thus, many of 
the structural reforms he suggest tend to be limited in their effect, or worse, beside 
the point (as with the ones advanced in Chapter V). The surest remedy, apparently, 
is continuing oversight and demonstrations of concern by political leaders with the 
power to secure results--or at least responses. The good news is that problems with 
continuing social bases of support will get this kind of attention in an electorally 
based system. The bad news is that the span of control possible is sharply limited in 
any government, however autocratic, Like the phenomenon under scrutiny, 
implementation studies threaten to broaden out into an ever-widening delta of petty 
corruptions and nonfeasance. Of all the limits on social action, perhaps the most 
poignant is the one arising from our inability to understand how we act, and 
therefore why. 
Reviewed by KAI N. LEE, Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies and Political 
Science, University of Washington, Seattle. 
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